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Abstract 
The deliberate practice view has generated a great deal of scientific and popular interest in expert 
performance. At the same time, the evidence indicates that deliberate practice, while undeniably 
important as a predictor of individual differences in performance, is not as important as Ericsson 
and colleagues have argued it is. In our main article, we found that individual differences in 
amount of deliberate practice accounted for about one-third of the reliable variance in music 
performance and chess performance, leaving the rest potentially explainable by other factors. 
Ericsson (2014-this issue) mounts a vigorous defense of his view, but the force of his defense is 
undercut by inconsistencies, oversights, and errors in his arguments. We reiterate that the task 
now for scientists interested in advancing understanding of expert performance is to develop and 
rigorously test falsifiable theories that take into account as many potentially relevant constructs 
as possible.      
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Accounting for Expert Performance: The Devil Is In the Details 
We thank Anders Ericsson for his contribution to this special issue of Intelligence on 
acquiring expertise, and we credit him for generating a great deal of interest in expert 
performance. Ericsson, Krampe, and Tesch-Römer’s (1993) study of musicians has been cited 
over four thousand times (Google Scholar) and was the stimulus for what the writer Malcolm 
Gladwell (2008) dubbed the “10,000 hour rule” (Ericsson, 2013). No psychologist has done more 
than Ericsson to promote the importance of environmental factors in acquiring expertise. 
The goal of our study (Hambrick, Oswald, Altmann, Meinz, Gobet, & Campitelli, 2014-
this issue) was to test Ericsson et al.’s (1993) claim that “individual differences in ultimate 
performance can largely be accounted for by differential amounts of past and current levels of 
practice” (p. 392, emphasis added). The claim was not supported: amount of deliberate practice 
accounted for about a third of the reliable variance in performance in music and chess, leaving 
the majority of the reliable variance unexplained. Thus, deliberate practice is important, just not 
as important as Ericsson et al. argued. Ericsson (2014-this issue) criticizes us for rejecting his 
view on a “common sense basis” (p. 18), but in fact, we reject his view on this empirical basis. 
Ericsson (2014-this issue) mounts a vigorous defense of his view—but one we believe 
fails for four major reasons. First, Ericsson rejects evidence that challenges his view even though 
he has used the same type of evidence to support his view, which we argue is a double standard. 
Specifically, Ericsson criticizes us for ignoring “the effects of forgetting, injuries, and accidents, 
along with the differential effects of different types of practice at different ages and levels of 
expert performance” (p. 4). However, Ericsson et al. ignored these factors in their own published 
analyses, ultimately basing their conclusion about the great importance of deliberate practice on 
the relationship between skill in music and a single variable: self-reported amount of practice 
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alone. Our reanalysis included studies that measured and operationally defined deliberate 
practice in the same way as in Ericsson et al. —indeed, our reanalysis included studies in which 
Ericsson was directly involved (Ericsson & Lehmann, 1994; Tuffiash, 2002) and studies that he 
has explicitly praised for methodological rigor and repeatedly cited as support for his view    
(e.g., Charness, Tuffiash, Krampe, Reingold, & Vasyukova, 2005). We followed the standards 
that Ericsson has set for himself in testing his view. 
Second, Ericsson (2014-this issue) makes claims that are contradicted by claims he has 
made elsewhere. Most notably, Ericsson argues that although we criticize him “for attributing 
too much emphasis to the effects due to deliberate practice” (p. 2), he and his colleagues have 
always acknowledged that “there might be other types of individual differences than those linked 
to innate talent ” (p. 2)—specifically, factors related to the proclivity and capacity to engage in 
deliberate practice (see Ericsson et al. p. 399). The implication here is that there may also be 
effects of these non-talent factors on performance—in other words, that they may have a direct 
link to performance, and thus may account for some of the variance in performance independent 
of deliberate practice. But elsewhere, Ericsson has claimed that the link of these factors to 
performance is indirect and mediated through deliberate practice. For example, he wrote, “The 
theoretical framework of expert performance explains individual differences in attained 
performance by the factors that influence the engagement in sustained extended deliberate 
practice, such as motivation…” (Ericsson, 2007, p. 4).   
Third, Ericsson (2014-this issue) does not mention evidence that is inconsistent with his 
perspective. In particular, although Ericsson argues that there is no evidence that general 
cognitive abilities predict individual differences in domain-specific performance in highly skilled 
performers, he does not report critical findings of some of the studies he cites. For example, 
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Ericsson notes that Meinz and Hambrick (2010) found a significant correlation between working 
memory and sight-reading performance, and argues that this finding is consistent with his 
perspective because the sample in that study included pianists from a low level of skill. 
However, Ericsson fails to note the central result of that study—that there was no interaction 
between deliberate practice and working memory capacity, indicating that working memory 
capacity positively predicted performance even at high levels of deliberate practice. Similarly, 
Ericsson notes that Horn and Masunaga (2006) found no correlation between Go ranking and 
scores on intelligence tests, but he fails to note that all other measures of Go-related performance 
in that study did correlate significantly with scores on intelligence tests (Masunaga & Horn, 
2001, Table 6). Describing the results of another study of sight-reading, Ericsson (2013) claimed 
that “Kopiez and Lee (2006) found that for musicians with lower sight-reading skill there was a 
correlation with their working memory. For musicians with a higher level of sight-reading skill 
there was no significant relation between their performance and their working memory” (p. 236). 
In this case, the error is one of commission: Kopiez and Lee reported no such finding. 
Finally, Ericsson (2014-this issue) makes material errors in describing procedures and 
results of others’ research (see Gagné, 2013, for further comment). He makes two such errors in 
describing a study of chess by two of us. First, he writes that “[d]ata was collected from 104 
respondents, but Campitelli and Gobet's (2008) [sic] only analyzed 90 participants and did not 
describe the objective reasons for discarding 14 of the collected questionnaires” (p. 14). If this 
claim were true, then one would be well advised to dismiss the results of this study. However, 
this claim is not true. Campitelli and Gobet did not discard collected questionnaires; rather, as 
they explained in their article, there were missing data: “Not all players answered all questions, 
with the result that the number of data points varies across our measures” (p. 448). Second, he 
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writes that “[i]t would be nice to have Gobet and Campitelli (2007) conduct a re-analysis that 
would identify the  amount of practice required prior to first attaining the rating of master” (p. 
13). If Gobet and Campitelli had not performed this analysis, then they would have had no solid 
basis for their conclusion that, contrary to Ericsson’s view, there is a large amount of variability 
in the amount of deliberate practice people need to achieve a given level of skill in chess. 
However, as they report in a major section of their article, Gobet and Campitelli performed 
exactly this analysis and found that amount of deliberate practice required to first attain the 
rating of master ranged from 728 to 16,120 hours—leading them to conclude that “the slowest 
player spent 22 times more hours than the fastest player!” (p. 166).  
Ericsson also calls into question our reporting of Gobet and Campitelli’s (2007) results. 
He writes, “Surprisingly, Hambrick et al. (2014-this issue) reports the lowest value for a chess 
master as 832 h instead of the 728 h as reported by Gobet and Campitelli (2007, p. 166) without 
providing an explanation for the difference” (p. 14), and “Surprisingly, Hambrick et al. (2014-
this issue) reports the highest value for a chess master as 24,284 h instead of the 16,120 h 
reported by Gobet and Campitelli (2007, p. 166) without providing an explanation for the 
difference” (p. 14). The explanation is that the different numbers reflect different measures, 
which should be clear from the published reports of these studies, as the measures are clearly 
defined. The range of 832 to 24,284 hours reported in Hambrick et al. (2014) is for accumulated 
amount of deliberate practice. The range of 728 to 16,120 hours reported in Gobet and 
Campitelli (2007) is for hours to reach master status, as noted above.  
 Ericsson has made important contributions to research on expert performance. 
Nonetheless, his defense of the deliberate practice view is undermined by inconsistencies, 
oversights, and errors in his arguments. The fact remains that amount of deliberate practice does 
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not largely account for individual differences in performance. The question now, for researchers 
interested in advancing the scientific understanding of expert performance, is what else matters.  
  
THE DEVIL IS IN THE DETAILS                                                                                             8 
 
References 
Campitelli, G., & Gobet, F. (2008). The role of practice in chess: A longitudinal study. Learning  
and Individual Differences, 18, 446-458. doi: 10.1016/j.lindif.2007.11.006 
Charness, N., Tuffiash, M., Krampe, R., Reingold, E., & Vasyukova, E. (2005). The role of  
deliberate practice in chess expertise. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 19, 151-165. doi: 
10.1002/acp.1106 
Ericsson, K. A. (2007). Deliberate practice and the modifiability of body and mind: toward  
science of the structure and acquisition of expert and elite performance. International 
Journal of Sports Psychology, 38, 4-34. 
Ericsson, K. A. (2013a). Psychotherapy and the science of human excellence. Keynote  
presentation at the 2013 Psychotherapy Networker Symposium.  
Ericsson, K. A. (2013b). My exploration of Gagné’s “evidence” for innate talent: It is Gagne  
who is omitting troublesome information so as to present more convincing accusations. 
In S. B. Kaufman (Ed.), The complexity of greatness: Beyond talent or practice (pp. 223-
254). New York: Oxford University Press. 
Ericsson, K. A. (2014). Why expert performance is special and cannot be extrapolated from 
studies of performance in the general population: A response to criticisms. Intelligence. 
doi: 10.1016/j.intell.2013.12.001 
 
Ericsson, K. A., Krampe, R. Th., & Tesch-Römer, C. (1993). The role of deliberate practice in 
the acquisition of expert performance. Psychological Review, 100, 363-406. doi: 
10.1037/0033295X.100.3.363 
Gagné, F. (2013). Yes, giftedness (aka “innate” talent) does exist! In S. B. Kaufman (Ed.), The  
THE DEVIL IS IN THE DETAILS                                                                                             9 
 
complexity of greatness: Beyond talent or practice (pp. 191-221). New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
Gobet, F., & Campitelli, G. (2007). The role of domain-specific practice, handedness, and  
starting age in chess. Developmental Psychology, 43, 159-172. doi: 10.1037/0012
 1649.43.1.159 
Gladwell, M. (2008). Outliers: The story of success. New York: Little, Brown and Company. 
Hambrick, D. Z., Oswald, F. L., Altmann, E. M., Meinz, E. J., Gobet, F., & Campitelli, G.  
(2014). Deliberate practice: Is that all it takes to become an expert? Intelligence. doi: 
10.1016/j.intell.2013.04.001 
Horn, J., & Masunaga, H. (2006). A merging theory of expertise and intelligence. In K. A.  
Ericsson, N. Charness, P. Feltovich, & R. R. Hoffman (Eds.), Cambridge handbook of 
expertise and expert performance (pp. 587-611). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Masunaga, H., & Horn,  J. (2001). Expertise and age-related changes in components of  
intelligence. Psychology and Aging, 16, 293-31. doi: 10.1037/0882-7974.16.2.293 
Meinz, E. J. & Hambrick, D. Z. (2010). Deliberate practice is necessary but not sufficient to 
explain individual differences in piano sight-reading skill: The role of working memory 
capacity. Psychological Science, 21, 914-919. doi: 10.1177/0956797610373933 
 
